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THE ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOC-
TRINE WITH EMPHASIS UPON ITS
APPLICATION IN WISCONSIN
Louis B. ADERMAN
T HE attractive nuisance theory appears to have originated about
a century ago when legal recognition was accorded to the natural
proclivities of children of tender years to become attracted to dan-
gerous instrumentalities. This led to the formation of the attractive
nuisance doctrine. Emphasis was placed upon the degree of care to
be exercised by the owner controlling the dangerous instrumentality.
In Lynch v. Nurdin,' a seven year old child trespassed upon an unat-
tended cart left in the street by the employee of the defendant. Chil-
dren had mounted the cart in pursuit of play. Lord Denman, in speak-
ing of the child's right in maintaining the action for injury resulting
from his fall from the wagon, pointed out that the child acting under
natural impulse, in obedience to his instinctive nature, was enticed to
meddle with the attractive cart, and that the danger of the situation
was created by the defendant in failing to observe the tendency of
children to play about unprotected vehicles.
Similar in character to the enticement of a child of tender years
directed by its propensity to an unguarded contrivance is the entrap-
ment of a dog which in obedience to its instinct is lured by a trap
baited with flesh.2 In the early decision of Townsend v. Wather3 moti-
vation of instinct is considered. In this case judgment was given to the
owner of a dog which became injured when drawn to a trap by the
savor of meat on a neighbor's premises.4 It has been emphasized and
reiterated by judical opinion upholding the attractive nuisance doctrine
that it is the duty incumbent upon a proprietor of an alluring instru-
mentality to take cognizance of the child's irresistible instinctive
11 Q.B. 30, 113 Eng. Rep. 1041 (1841).
2 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. McDonald, 152 U.S. 262, 14 Sup. Ct. 619, 38 L.ed. 745
(1893); Justice Crownhart, dissenting opinion, Lewko v. Chas. Krause Mill-
ing Co., 179 Wis. 83, 190 N.W. 924 (1922); 1 THOMPSON, NEGLIGENCE 305.
3 9 East 277, 103 Eng. Rep. 579 (1808).
4 Lord Ellenborough, C. J.: "The traps were placed so near to the plaintiff's
court yard where his dogs were kept that they might scent the bait, without
committing any trespass on the defendant's wood. Every man must be taken
to contemplate the probable consequences of the act he does. And therefore
when the defendant caused traps scented with the strongest meats to be
placed so near to the plaintiff's house as to influence the instinct of those
animals and draw them irresistibly to their destruction, he must be considered
as contemplating this probable consequence of his act." Townsend v. Wather,
9 East 277, 279, 103 Eng. Rep. 579 (1808).
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nature to come within the zone of the allurement transforming it into
an entrapment which may result in injury or death to the child.5
In cognizance of the child's impulsive conduct, the Supreme Court
of the United States in 1872 made a distinction between the degree of
care necessary to be exercised by an adult and the care required of a
child of tender years under the same or similar circumstances." justice
Hunt said: "The rule of law in regard to the negligence of an adult,
and the rule in regard to that of an infant of tender years is quite dif-
ferent. By the adult there must be given that care and attention for
his own protection that is ordinarily exercised by persons of intelli-
gence and discretion. If he fails to give it, his injury is the result of
his own folly, and cannot be visited upon another. Of an infant of
tender years less discretion is required, and the degree depends upon
his age and knowledge. ' 7
In 1873 the attractive nuisance doctrine took root in this country.
It was then that the United States Supreme Court in Sioux City &
Pac. R. R. Co. v. StoutP examined the question of whether a proprie-
tor of a turntable left unlocked was negligent in failing to exercise an
alleged duty to a child of six years who was injured while playing on
the turntable. The decision of this question depended upon the condi-
tion, situation, and place of the turntable. In the early turntables cases,
liability was incurred by the railroad company operating the turntable
when the company failed to observe the required care and duty to the
child in protecting it from injury, the company knowing that an
unguarded or unlocked turntable was attractive and dangerous to chil-
dren; children had previously played on the turntable giving the com-
pany sufficient ground to anticipate that they would resort to it again;
the particular unprotected turntable lured the child in question into
a trap.9
5 In Powers v. Harlow, 53 Mich. 507, 515, 19 N.W. 257 (1875), Judge Cooley
said, "Children, wherever they go must be expected to act upon childish in-
stincts and impulses; and others who are chargeable with a duty of care and
caution towards them must calculate upon this and take precaution accord-
ingly." See also Sioux City & Pac. R. R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 21 L.ed.
745 (1873); Meibus v. Dodge, 38 Wis. 300 (1875); Dublin Cotton Oil Co. v.
Jarrard (Tex. 1897), 40 S.W. 531; Drew v. Lett, 95 Ind. App. 89, 182 N.E.
547 (1932); Bicandi v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 55 Idaho 543, 44 P. (2d)
1103 (1935); Meredith v. Fehr, 262 Ky. 648, 90 S.W. (2d) 1021 (1936).
'-Washington etc. R. R. Co. v. Gladmon, 82 U.S. 401, 21 L.ed. 114 (1872).
7Washington etc. R. R. Co v. Gladmon, 82 U.S. 401, 408, 21 L.ed. 114 (1872).
8 Sioux City & Pac. R. R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 21 L.ed. 745 (1873).
9 In Sioux City & Pac. R. R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 659, 21 L.ed. 745 (1873),
the United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, and
approved the instructions of that court in which it was stated that "to main-
tain the action it must appear by the evidence that the turn-table, in the
condition, situation and place where it then was, was a dangerous machine,
one which, if unguarded or unlocked, would be likely to cause injury to
children." See also Keffe v. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. Co., 21 Minn. 207 (1875).
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The decision of the Stout case led to the adoption of three differ-
ent rules pertaining to the attractive nuisance doctrine, namely: The
proprietor is subject to liability to a child trespasser only if under the
same circumstances he would be answerable to an adult trespasserY'
The proprietor is liable to an infant trespasser who being attracted to
a dangerous instrumentality on his premises prior to his instrusion
resorted to it and was injured or killed as a result of his contact with
the dangerous structure." The proprietor is liable to an infant tres-
passer injured or killed while playing near an instrumentality on his
premises, although the child failed to notice the instrumentality before
entering the premises.-2
Courts repudiating the attractive nuisance doctrine make no dis-
tinction between a child and an adult trespasser, refusing to impose
extra care on the occupant in case of the child intruder, contending
that: The owner has no intention to invite or entrap the child. The
possessor's profitable use of the instrumentality must not be limited
or diminished. The structure being harmless in and of itself must
remain intact for the owner's intended use.'3 Apparently, the latest
case in England on the doctrine of attractive nuisance is Addie v.
Dumbreck,'4 in which case, contrary to the warnings of the defend-
ants, the land had been used by young children as a playground.
Among other children attracted to play with an unprotected terminal
wheel located on the field of the defendant was a boy under five years
of age who was crushed to death by the wheel. Because the boy was
declared a trespasser by the court, the defendants were not responsible
for his death. Lord Buckmaster asserted: "The conclusion to my mind
is irresistible, that the child, who could know nothing of the law of
trespass or licence, was in fact a trespasser . . If it once be held
that the child was a trespasser, innocent as the trespass was, there was
no legal duty cast upon the appellants (the defendants) to afford pro-
tection against the danger which they must have known use of the
land by the children almost necessarily involved."' 5
During the period following the Stout case, a tendency was mani-
fested by some courts to differentiate between two kinds of duties of
an occupant to a child intruder. The proprietor's only duty to a child
trespassing upon his premises without express or implied permission
o Daniels v. New York & New England Railroad Co., 154 Mass. 349, 28 N.E.
283 (1891); Thompson v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 218 Pa. 444, 67 Atl. 768
(1907); Smith, Liability of Landowners to Children Entering Without Per-
mission (1898) 11 HARV. L. REv. 349.
""McDermott v. Burke, 256 Ill. 401, 100 N.E. 168 (1912) ; Drew v. Lett, 95 Ind.
App. 89, 182 N.E. 547 (1932).
"Best v. District of Columbia, 291 U.S. 411, 54 Sup. Ct. 487, 78 L.ed. 882 (1934).
Is Thompson v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 218 Pa. 444, 67 Atl. 768 (1907).
" [1929] A.C. 358.
'
5 Addie v. Dumbreck [1929] A.C. 358.
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is to prevent an unintentional injury to it. The possessor of a dangerous
unprotected structure is obligated to prevent injury to a child who is
allured by the instrumentality on his premises; the child, although
technically termed a trespasser, accepted an implied invitation to play
with the instrumentality by virtue of the attraction."
Twenty years after the Stout case, the United States Supreme
Court declared that a railroad company violated its duty to a twelve
year old boy who fell into a burning slack pit maintained by the com-
pany. Acting on impulse to see the coal mine in a vicinity where he
was visiting for the first time, the child suddenly frightened by boys,
sought escape by way of a nearby path when he was precipitated into
an unguarded pit. The duty was principally imposed upon the railroad
company, because children to the knowledge of the company had
played near the dangerous pit prior to the plaintiff's injury.5 This
same court, however, in United Zinc and Chemical Co. v. Britt,"0
emphasized that under the attractive nuisance doctrine, the landowner
is not liable to a child trespasser who entered upon his land without
being baited thereto by a potentially dangerous object, such as a pond. 0
The courts that take full cognizance of the natural inclinations of
children to play or to come in contact with a dangerous structure do
not draw a line of demarcation as to the causation of the trespass. In
other words, it is immaterial whether the trespass was committed by
the child as a result of the attraction or whether the intrusion preceded
the arrestation of the child's attention to the dangerous object. Mr.
10 "Infants have no greater right to go upon other people's land than adults, and
the mere fact that they are infants imposes no duty upon landowners to expect
them and to prepare for their safety. On the other hand, the duty of one
who invites another upon his land, not to lead him into a trap, is well settled,
and while it is very plain that temptation is not invitation, it may be held that
knowingly to establish and expose, unfenced, to children of an age when they
follow a bait as mechanically as a fish, something that is certain to attract
them, has the legal effect of an invitation to them, although not to an adult."
United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268, 275, 42 Sup. Ct. 299, 66
L.ed. 615 (1921).7 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. McDonald, 152 U.S. 262, 14 Sup. Ct. 619, 38 L.ed. 434
(1893).
18 Justice Harlan: "Under all of these circumstances, the railroad company
ought not to be heard to say that the plaintiff, a mere lad, moved by curiosity
to see the mine, in the vicinity of the slack pit, was a trespasser to whom
it owed no duty or for whose protection it was under no obligation to make
provision." Union Pac. Co. v. McDonald, 152 U.S. 262, 279, 14 Sup. Ct. 619,
38 L.ed. 745 (1893).
19 258 U.S. 268, 42 Sup. Ct. 299, 66 L.ed. 615 (1921).2o Two children, eight and eleven years of age, crossed the unfenced land of
the defendant while their parents were camping nearby. The pool on this
land containing sulphuric acid and zinc sulphate appeared to children as an
ideal swimming pool. No danger sign indicating the poisonous character of
the water was given. The children went into the water and succumbed to the
poison. Justice Holmes: "In the case at bar it is at least doubtful whether
the water could be seen from any place where the children lawfully were,
and there is no evidence that it was what led them to enter the land. But that
is necessary to start the supposed duty."
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Chief Justice Hughes, in Best v. Dist. of Columbia,2 ' giving the rea-
sons for disregarding the element of attraction as a necessary condi-
tion precedent to the trespass, stated: "The duty must find its source
in special circumstances in which, by reason of the inducement and of
the fact the visits of children to the place would naturally be antici-
pated, and because of the character of the danger to which they would
unwittingly be exposed, reasonable prudence would require that pre-
cautions be taken for their protection."
In a recent decision,2 2 the attractive nuisance doctrine was applied
in accordance with the principle adopted by Best v. Dist. of Columbia.
While playing with other children on a pile of lumber on an unfenced
private lot where wrecking materials were sorted, a boy of five years
of age was injured. Although the defendant had previously warned
children to stay off the premises, and even employed a watchman to
guard the area, he was nevertheless liable for the child's injury, as the
court expressly declared. "It (the attractive nuisance doctrine) is but
a convenient phrase to designate one sort of case within the ordinary
rule, that one is liable for injury resulting to another from failure to
exercise, for the protection of the injured child, the degree of care
commensurate with and therefore demanded by the circumstances. The
greater the hazard, the greater the care required."
At the present time, the jurisdictions opposed to limited liability
by the proprietor to a child trespasser tend to adopt the following as
constituting the attractive nuisance doctrine :23 A person is liable to a
child trespasser of tender years for injury caused by an artificial con-
dition upon the premises of that person if:
1. "The place where the condition is maintained is one upon which
the possessor knows or should know that such children are
likely to trespass."
2. "The condition is one of which the possessor knows or should
know .... involving an unreasonable risk of death, or serious
bodily harm to such children."
3. "The children because of their youth do not discover the con-
dition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling in it or in
coming within the area made dangerous by it."
4. "The utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is
slight as compared to the risk to young children involved
therein. ' '2a
21291 U.S. 411, 419, 78 L.ed. 882 (1934).2 Gimmestad v. Rose Co., 194 Minn. 531, 261 N.W. 194 (1935).
23 Angelier v. Red Star Yeast & Products Co., 215 Wis. 47, 254 N.W. 351 (1933);
Jackson v. Robert L. Reisinger & Co., 219 Wis. 535, 263 N.W. 641 (1935);
Prather v. Union Nat. Bank, (N.C. 1937) 189 S.E. 182; Gimmestad v. Rose
Bros. Co., 194 Minn. 531, 261 N.W. 194 (1935).
-
3
a See RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 339.
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GENERAL APPLICATION OF THE ATrRAcTnrE NUISANCE DOCTRINE
IN WISCONSIN
Although the courts of Wisconsin have never had the occasion to
apply directly the Stout case rule,' involving injury to a child playing
on an unprotected turntable, they have nevertheless explicitly formu-
lated and defined the duty of a proprietor of a dangerous contrivance
in protecting children from harm. As early as 1875, judicial opinion
in Wisconsin manifested recognition of instinct as a decisive factor in
the child's conduct, and in accordance with this concept, imposed
upon the child the degree of care to be exercised by it when near the
dangerous object.
The attractive nuisance doctrine has been adopted in Wisconsin.m
The extent of its application in this state, however, involves considera-
tion of the location of the instrumentality, the status of the child, the
risk the child takes in playing upon or near the contrivance, - all
viewed in the light of the circumstances of each particular case.7 The
location of the structure perilous to the safety of children is instru-
mental in determining the proprietor's liability to the child under the
doctrine2 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has employed the attrac-
tive nuisance theory in legal controversies where the unsafe structure
or condition was kept on private property. For some time, the ten-
dency was to disregard the attractive nuisance doctrine in decisions
where the alluring structure was located on private property, on the
ground that the owner in the lawful use of the instrumentality was
not legally bound to protect children from incurring injury through
contact with the object.2 It was inferred from these determinations
that liability would nevertheless be imposed upon the possessor in
favor of the child when the dangerous object was so near to the high-
way that it was a public nuisance to those using the highway, 0 or
when the acts of the proprietor at the time of the injury constituted
either gross negligence or active negligence.3
24 Note (1920) 1 Wis. L. REy. 189.
25 Meibus v. Dodge, 38 Wis. 300 (1875).
20 Angelier v. Red Star Yeast & Products Co., 215 Wis. 47, 254 N.W. 351 (1933);
Matson v. Dane County, 177 Wis. 649, 189 N.W. 154 (1922) ; Kelly v. Southern
Wisconsin R. Co., 152 Wis. 328, 140 N.W. 60 (1913).
27 Note (1932) 17 MARQ. L. REv. 67.
2 8 Emond v. Kimberly-Clark Co., 159 Wis. 83, 149 N.W. 760 (1914); Kelly v.
Southern Wisconsin R. Co., 152 Wis. 328, 140 N.W. 60 (1913).
29 "Our court has held that a person may be liable for the maintenance of a
dangerous object upon or over private property where such object is deadly
in its effect and the danger of coming in contact with it not obvious to
every one, but it has not gone to the extent of holding a person liable to
trespassers for mere ordinary passive negligence in the usual conduct of a
lawful and customary business upon his own premises." Zartner v. George,
156 Wis. 131, 137, 145 N.W. 971 (1914).
30Klix v. Nieman, 68 Wis. 271, 32 N.W. 223 (1887).
31 Zartner v. George, 156 Wis. 131, 145 N.W. 971 (1914) ; Lewko v. Chas. Krau§q
Milling Co., 179 Wis. 83, 190 N.W. 924 (1922).
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With the singular exception of cases dealing with accidents to chil-
dren playing in ponds 3 2 the Wisconsin court has shown a pre-disposi-
tion to grant recovery for the injury or death to a child resulting from
meddling with the instrumentality on private premises upon proof
that :33
1. The structure or artificial condition "which was inherently dan-
gerous to children" was suffered by the proprietor to exist upon
his premises.
2. The proprietor "should have realized" that: a. The structure
or artificial condition was inherently dangerous to children. b.
The structure or artificial condition involved an unreasonable
risk of serious bodily injury or death to children. c. " . . chil-
dren .... were likely to trespass upon his premises."
3. The injured child because of his youth or tender age, did not
discover the condition or realize the risk involved in .... play-
ing in close proximity to the inherently dangerous condition."
4. "Safeguards could reasonably have been provided which would
have obviated the inherent danger without materially interfer-
ing with the purpose for which the artificial condition was
maintained."3 3a
When a child is injured by a dangerous instrumentality on the
street, it is free of negligence, provided it has exercised such care as
is "ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discre-
tion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar circum-
stances. ' 34 It is judicially noticed that children play upon the street,
and in recognition of the child's inclination to use the street, the courts
have declared that children have a legal right to play thereon. To
protect this right, the possessor of the dangerous instrumentality is
required to exercise ordinary care in preventing injury to the child.
32 Fiel v. City of Racine, 203 Wis. 149, 233 N.W. 611 (1930).
33 Angelier v. Red Star Yeast & Products Co., 215 Wis. 47, 53, 254 N.W. 351
(1933); to the same effect see Jackson v. Robert L. Reisinger & Co., 219
Wis. 535, 538, 263 N.W. 641 (1935); Brinilson v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co.,
144 Wis. 614, 129 N.W. 664 (1911); Meyer v. Menominee & Marinette Light
& Traction Co., 151 Wis. 279, 138 N.W. 1008 (1912); Herrem v. Konz, 165
Wis. 574, 162 N.W. 654 (1917).
33a Angelier v. Red Star Yeast & Products Co., 215 Wis. 47, 53, 254 N.W. 351
(1933).
3 Goldberg v. Berkowitz, 173 Wis. 603, 606, 181 N.W. 216 (1921).
a In Ptak v. Kuetemeyer, 182 Wis. 357, 363, 196 N.W. 855 (1924), the court
said, "While streets are dedicated primarily for the purpose of public travel,
nevertheless it must be realized and recognized that children are accustomed
to use highways for the purposes of play." Justice Marshall in Kelly v. South-
ern Wisconsin R. Co., 152 Wis. 328, 338, 140 N.W. 60 (1913) said: "Children
have, as it is said, a subservient right to play in the street and their safety
in doing so must not be imperiled by any act of a person which he has rea-
sonable ground to expect may probably do so, even though the danger be
only rendered active through infantile curiosity or instinct for play."
[Vol. 21
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What has been established in this state is that "children are liable
always to be upon the public streets * * * and play or meddle with
attractive things left thereon; that a reasonable man must bear this
fact in mind, and hence may not negligently or willfully place upon
the street a dangerous animal or trap well calculated to arouse the
admiration or curiosity of a child, and when it has accomplished the
natural result, which might reasonably be expected, escape the conse-
quences by saying that the injured child should not have yielded to his
curiosity."3
It appears that the courts have not always applied the attractive
nuisance doctrine to cases where the injury to the child occurred on
the street as a result of the child's playing with the dangerous instru-
mentality. Under circumstances, where the attractive nuisance doctrine
apparently could be applied, some courts impose liability, on the princi-
ple that the alluring instrumentality is a public nuisance37 In Busse v.
Rogers38 Justice Winslow refused to recognize the principle of the
attractive nuisance in the case of a young child who was hurt while
playing on a lumber pile in the street. The timber carelessly laid on
the lumber pile by the defendant rolled to the street causing the
accident. Justice Winslow, in rendering the decision in this case stated,
"It is the case of an owner placing an unlawful nuisance on the high-
way and leaving it unguarded. ' ' sa The law of nuisance was again
applied in the case of Bruhnke v. La Crosse3- where a child was
injured in the street. A distinction was observed between the attrac-
tive nuisance doctrine and the principle of liability arising from a
public nuisance. In reference to this distinction, the court asserted,
"An automobile, a carriage, or a dumping wagon is each attractive
and dangerous to children. . . . But that does not make either, when
in legitimate use, a nuisance in the public street."39a The attractive
nuisance doctrine was applied in Kelly v. Southern Wis. R. R. Co.40 in
which case a child suffered injury through contact with an electric
wire in the street. Justice Marshall approving the adoption of the doc-
trine in Wisconsin stated, "Conservation of child life and safety as to
artificial perils, is one of such importance that ordinary care may well
hold everyone responsible for creating or maintaining a condition
involving any such, with reasonable ground for apprehending that
children of tender years may probably be allured thereinto. In many
36 Busse v. Rogers, 120 Wis. 443, 455, 98 N.W. 219 (1904).37 Busse v. Rogers, 120 Wis. 443, 98 N.W. 219 (1904); Bruhnke v. La Crosse,
155 Wis. 485, 144 N.W. 1100 (1914).
38 120 Wis. 443, 98 N.W. 219 (1904).
38a See case cited in note 38 at p. 453.
39 155 Wis. 485, 144 N.W. 1100 (1914).
39a See case cited in note 39 at p. 488.
40 152 Wis. 328, 140 N.W. 60 (1913).
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courts that has been applied generally,-to private premises where
children have no right to be, and to public places and those visited by
license as well,--while other courts restrict it to the rightful visita-
tions. This court, perhaps, has not taken a decided stand on the broad
lines indicated, though the writer is of the opinion that it has, in logical
effect, and would assert it and defend it as sound doctrine, demanded
by precedent, principle, and humanity."4'
Judicial authority in Wisconsin does not adopt the attractive nui-
sance doctrine in cases involving injury to a child from an appliance
located on public ground used for governmental functions. In Bern-
stein v. Milwaukee, 2 the defendant city maintained in a portion of a
public playground certain devices for the use of children over twelve
years of age. A nine-year-old child who was permitted by the defend-
ant to play on one of these appliances was seriously hurt. The supreme
court affirmed the order sustaining a demurrer to the complaint on the
ground that "negligence in the performance of a governmental func-
tion by the officers or agents of a municipality does not give a right
of action."4 The application of this rule resulted in a denial of recov-
ery in Gensch v. City of Milwaukee,4 in which case a five-year-old
boy was killed when he fell from a wooden locker while playing with
other children in a public bathhouse.
A line of demarcation is drawn between the duty of a proprietor
of an attractive instrumentality on private premises as distinguished
from an alluring structure located on public property. In the former
instance, the attractive nuisance doctrine is applicable, because there
the instrument is primarily maintained for use by others than children,
obligating the proprietor to obviate danger to children enticed to the
structure. The same doctrine, on the other hand, cannot be applied
to an instrumentality on governmental premises operated for a public
function, because the instrument on a public playground is placed
chiefly for the purpose of attracting children to play thereon, and for
this reason the instrumentality may be left unlocked without creating
a duty of care to the child.4
4' Kelly v. Southern Wisconsin R. Co., 152 Wis. 328, 337, 140 N.W. 60 (1913).
42 158 Wis. 576, 149 N.W. 382 (1914).
4 Bernstein v. Milwaukee, 158 Wis. 576, 578, 149 N.W. 382 (1914). Since the
decision of Higgins v. Superior, 134 Wis. 264, 114 N.W. 490 (1908), a gov-
ernmental agency is not responsible in damages for the negligence of its
employees while rendering a governmental service. Cf. Skirls v. City of Port
Washington (Wis. 1936), 269 N.W. 556; Virovatz v. City of Cudahy, 211
Wis. 357, 247 N.W. 341 (1933); Erickson v. Village of West Salem, 205
Wis. 107, 236 N.W. 579 (1931) ; De Baere v. Town of Oconto, 208 Wis. 377,
243 N.W. 221 (1932).
"179 Wis. 95, 190 N.W. 843 (1922).
45 Solomon v. Red River Lumber Co., 56 Cal. App. 742, 206 Pac. 498 (1922);
Smith v. Iowa City, 213 Iowa 391, 239 N.W. 29 (1931); Royston's Estate v.
City of Charlotte (Mich. 1936), 270 N.W. 288.
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THE DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO VARIOUS CAUSES OF INJURIES
IN WISCONSIN
In Wisconsin the attractive nuisance doctrine has been applied in
cases where children were injured while playing on lumber piles."
In Meyer v. Menominee & Marinette Light & Traction Co." the
defendant placed a lumber pile on his property near a road used by
people for travel. The lumber pile by virtue of its being accessible to
children attracted their attention to play thereon. A young boy while
playing on the top of the lumber pile took hold of highly charged
sagging wires that were within his reach and was electrocuted. In
declaring the defendant negligent, the court governed impliedly by the
attractive nuisance principle, stated, "In the case at bar the evidence
was ample to warrant the jury in finding that for a long time before
the accident, the defendant knew or ought to have known, that chil-
dren were likely to be upon the lumber pile and be injured by contact
with the wires, and that defendant was guilty of negligence in the
use of its wires at the time and place of the death of the deceased." 47a
In the Meyer case emphasis was placed on the importance of hav-
ing the proprietor of a dangerous instrumentality exercise due care
in obviating danger to children, who to his knowledge played or were
likely to play in the proximity of the dangerous location. This prin-
ciple determined the decision of Jackson v. Robert L. Reisinger & Co.48
Here the court decided that the defendant was not guilty of negligence
under the attractive nuisance doctrine, because to his knowledge chil-
dren had not played upon the dangerous lumber pile, located in the
center of his unfenced premises, prior to the accident in question.
Justice Fowler, pointing out the decisive factor in this decision stated,
"The place where the condition existed seems to be the point to which
the inquiry should be directed. a4sa The defendant was not held liable
for the death of the child who was killed in falling from the lumber
pile on which he played, although children had trespassed upon the
defendant's premises, playing on sand piles and places where men were
working at a distance from the particular dangerous condition.
Similar in character to the lumber pile cases are those involving
injury or death to children as a result of their meddling with electric
current wires. In either case the proprietor is exempt from liability,
provided he had no knowledge or had no reason to know that the
Busse v. Rogers, 120 Wis. 443, 98 N.W. 219 (1904), refused to decide that the
attractive nuisance doctrine is applicable to a case where the lumber pile was
on the street, manifesting the limitation that the doctrine is applicable only
where the structure attractive to children is on private property.
47 151 Wis. 279, 138 N.W. 1008 (1912).
4,1a See case cited in note 47 at p. 285.
-8219 Wis. 535, 263 N.W. 641 (1935).
4a See case cited in note 48 at p. 538.
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place of injury was previously frequented by children.49 The Wiscon-
sin court recognizing that children of tender years, guided by instinct,
are incapable of forseeing and appreciating the potential danger
involved in playing with electric current tends to impose on the person
handling the wires a duty to exercise, "a high degree of watchfulness
for the prevention of accidents" to children coming in contact with
the wires. The duty, however, placed upon the owner of the wires
extends only to the risks he reasonably anticipated by a prudent per-
son under the circumstances. The court has held that "whether
deceased in the instant case was a bare licensee or invitee when upon
the lumber pile, if defendant knew or ought to have known that boys
of his age were accustomed to be there, it was chargeable with due
care in the management of its poles, wires, and current so as to pro-
tect children and others who might be expected to be there from
injury, and was bound to anticipate that some injury might result to
someone in consequence of the location and condition of the wires. 'r0
In Haselneyer v. The Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co.5 the infant plaintiff
while playing pull-away with other children touched a live power wire
in the street. For the resulting injury to his hand, he recovered judg-
ment, because "he had no comprehension of the deadly quality of the
current with which he toyed.' '5la A similar case is Bonniwell v. Mil-
waukee Light, Heat & Traction Co.,52 where a boy, in a farming dis-
trict, climbed one of three towers carrying wires with thousands of
volts, a feat never before attempted by any child. Touching the wire,
the boy received severe burns causing his death. Because the fatal
injury of the child could not have been foreseen and obviated by the
exercise of reasonable care on the part of the defendant owner, he,
consequently, was not liable under the attractive nuisance doctrine.
It is a well known fact that children will play about excavations
and ditches in the street necessitating an exercise of care on the part
of the building contractors to prevent the excavations from becoming
death traps to infant intruders. Secard v. Rhinelander Lighting Co. _3
concerns a nine-year-old girl who met death in an unguarded ditch.
Disregarding the warning of her older sister, the little girl continued
to play in the zone of danger and when about ready to jump across
the hole, she fell headlong into it, and was buried by a cave-in causing
-9 Bonniwell v. Milwaukee Light, Heat & Traction Co., 174 Wis. 1, 182 N.W.
468 (1921); Jackson v. Robert L. Reisinger & Co., 219 Wis. 535, 263 N.W.
641 (1935).
51 Meyer v. Menominee & Marinette Light & Traction Co., 151 Wis. 279, 285,
138 N.W. 1008 (1912).
w' 185 Wis. 210, 201 N.W. 257 (1924).
sla See case cited in note 51 at p. 214.
52174 Wis. 1, 182 N.W. 468 (1921).
53 147 Wis. 614, 133 N.W. 45 (1912).
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her death. In allowing recovery for the death of the child, the court
observed that the defendant contractor, because of his failure to warn
the children of the risk of a possible cave-in, "created a serious danger
by which children, lawfully in the street, were liable to be injured."5 3a
The same observation was made in Ptak v. KueteneyerA in which
case the plaintiff recovered damages for the death of his six-year-old
son who was killed by a cave-in while playing in a ditch under con-
struction. To the knowledge of the defendant, a plumber-contractor,
children, attracted by the ditch located on the street in a city residential
section, resorted to play about it prior to the accident. The court
declaring the defendant guilty of negligence, gave implied affirmation
to the attractive nuisance doctrine, when it stated, "From evidence in
the case and from the knowledge which the average adult normal
human being is presumed to possess with respect to activities of
children, it must be assumed that the defendant knew or should have
known that children would be liable to enter this ditch at a time when
construction work for the day had ceased."' a
Two interesting cases testing the extent of the application of the at-
tractive nuisance doctrine in Wisconsin are Kelly v. Southern Wiscon-
sin R. R. Co.55 and Webster v. Corcoran Brothers Co."8 Both of these
decisions have arisen out of injuries to children occasioned by a rope
which the defendant used in lawful work. The absence of ordinary
care required in guarding children lawfully on the street against med-
dling with a dangerous instrumentality located thereon constituted neg-
ligence on the part of a defendant company. In Kelly v. Southern Wis-
consin R. R. Co. the defendant used a rope and pulley to string an elec-
tric feed wire on the street. A six-year-old boy attracted by the rope
began to play with it and hurt his hand as it was drawn into the
pulley put in movement by the defendant. In the subsequent case of
Webster v. Corcoran Brothers Co. a rope and a pulley were used to
unload oats into a barn. A boy, who with other children was watching
the operation of the pulley, was asked by one of the employees of the
defendant to remove a kink formed in the rope. As the boy took hold
of the rope his hand was caught in the pulley. Here, too, the defendant
was guilty of negligence for the injury to the child. The distinction
observed between the two cases was that in the latter instance the child
was expressly asked by the defendant to handle the rope. In the
Webster decision the court pointing out its similarity to Kelly v. South-
ern R. R. Co. stated, "It was competent for appellant (defendant) to
53a See case cited in note 53 at p. 618.
-4 182 Wis. 357, 196 N.W. 855 (1924).
0a See case cited in note 54 at p. 364.
55 152 Wis. 328, 140 N.W. 60 (1913).
-6 156 Wis. 576, 146 N.W. 815 (1914).
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unload its grain where it did. It was charged with knowledge that
young children,--too young, without efficient warning and considerable
oversight, to be free from peril of personal injury in case of being
allowed to be near the rope,-were liable to be rightfully in the
vicinity. In such circumstances it owed such children the duty of
ordinary care to keep them without the zone of danger. In that respect
the situation was quite similar to Kelly v. Southern Wisconsin R. R.
Co."P5 a
Zartner v. George5 and Lewko v. Chas. Krause Milling Co."
constitute two interesting Wisconsin cases, because of their rejection
of the attractive nuisance doctrine, which doctrine at a later date was
resumed and affirmed in a case similar in circumstances. In the Zartner
case, a child trespassed upon a private lot where a building was being
erected. He stepped into a box of hot lime screened by a thin coat of
sand and suffered severe burns. Although to the knowledge of the
defendant contractor, children were attracted to the lot and played
thereon, the court in its decision disregarded the doctrine by denying
recovery to the child, on the ground that he was a trespasser. Now in
the Lewko case, the same court denied recovery to a child under five
years of age, who, encroaching upon the defendant's premises, fell into
an open pit containing hot water and steam and was injured. The
determination in this case was based on the rule, that "a mere licensee
on private property takes the premises as he finds them. The owner
owes him no duty, save to refrain from active negligence rendering
the premises dangerous. ' ' -5 a
This tendency of the court to base its decision primarily on the
status of the child in utter disregard of the child's instinctive conduct,
was completely annulled in Angelier v. Red Star Yeast & Products
Co., 9 a case similar in facts to that of Lewko v. Chas. Krause Milling
Co. The present attitude as expressly defined in the words of the
court reads, "Whether the technical legal status of a young child who
enters upon the premises of another for purposes of play is a tres-
passer, a licensee, or an invitee by implication is, in our opinion, quite
immaterial, in a case like this where the circumstances and conditions
shown or alleged bring the case within 'the attractive nuisance
doctrine'. g5 9 a The principle just elucidated found expression in cases
preceding the Angelier decision.0 0 In Herrem v. Konz,61 the court
56a See case cited in note 56 at p. 579.
51 156 Wis. 131, 145 N.W. 971 (1914).
s 179 Wis. 83, 190 N.W. 924 (1922).
58a See case cited in note 58 at p. 85.
59215 Wis. 47, 254 N.W. 351 (1933).
59a See case cited in note 59 at p. 53.
0 O'Brien v. Fred Kroner Hardware Co., 175 Wis. 238, 185 N.W. 205 (1921);
Brinilson v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 144 Wis. 614, 129 N.W. 664 (1911).
01 165 Wis. 574, 578, 162 N.W. 654 (1917).
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rendering its decision in favor of the plaintiff made no attempt to
determine the status of the child, although the case was impliedly gov-
erned by the attractive nuisance doctrine. This controversy was based
upon injury to a nine-year-old child who was trapped by an unguarded
revolving shaft located underneath the mill of the defendant. Children,
to the knowledge and consent of the defendant, played in close prox-
imity to the inherently dangerous structure. In view of these facts,
the court decided, "Under these circumstances the defendant was
bound to anticipate that an injury might result to some child by coming
in contact" with the instrumentality.
Wisconsin courts have persistently refused to apply the attractive
nuisance doctrine in cases where children were injured while playing
on lawfully used moving or standing vehicles. The doctrine is repudi-
ated in cases dealing with vehicles when the defendant could not,
prior to the injury, reasonably or possibly anticipate the extraordinary
conduct of the child under the circumstances of the case 6 2 In Routt v.
Look 6 3 the supreme court reversed a judgment in favor of a trespass-
ing child under four years of age who was injured as he fell from the
side of a moving truck which he climbed as the vehicle passed through
a public alley. The cburt affirmed the rule that the driver of a moving
truck "is not required to look out for children who may attempt to
climb onto the sides or the rear of his vehicle." justice Rosenberry
maintained that, "In cases where the attractive nuisance theory is not
applicable the duty of a driver to look out for the safety of a child
does not arise unless and until he is advised or knows that the child is
in a perilous position.6 3 a The view expressed in the Routt case was
formerly declared in Bruhnke v. La Crosse,'" where a child followed
and clung to the chains of a dump wagon lawfully moving upon the
highway, and was hurt when the person in charge of the wagon
released the dumping device.
In each case, the test is whether the owner of the vehicle exercised
reasonable care to avoid injury to children. The owner is not required
to take cognizance of the unusual indulgence of children on or about
the vehicle. An interesting case illustrating the degree of care expected
of the owner operating the vehicle, in avoiding injury to children is
-Gamble v. Uncle Sam Oil Co. of Kansas, 100 Kan. 74, 163 Pac. 627 (1917) ;
Michalek v. City of Chicago (Ill. 1936), 4 N.E. (2d) 256; Routt v.
Look, 180 Wis. 1, 191 N.W. 557 (1923); Kressine v. Janesville Traction Co.,
175 Wis. 192, 184 N.W. 777 (1921); Kollentz v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co.,
170 Wis. 454, 175 N.W. 929 (1920); Bauer, The Degree of Danger and the
Degree of Difficulty of Removal of the Danger as Factors in Attractive Ni-
sance Cases (1933) 18 MINN. L. REv. 523, 535.
13 180 Wis. 1, 10, 191 N.W. 557 (1923).
63a 180 Wis. 1, 11, 191 N.W. 557 (1923).
1" 155 Wis. 485, 144 N.W. 1100 (1914).
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Kressine v. Janesville Traction Co.0 5 In this case, the plaintiff infant
was playing with other children on a street car standing at the end of
a city line. The children placed the trolley pole in contact with the
electric wire and started the car with an instrument never before used
as a controller. This caused the street car to collide with another
trolley, which collision resulted in injury to the plaintiff child. In refus-
ing to permit recovery, the court said, "The dangers which it was the
duty of the company to guard against were such as reasonably might
have been anticipated. * * * It was not the duty of the company to so
dismantle or disempower the car as to render it harmless under every
conceivable circumstance. * * * It was not bound to anticipate conse-
quences resulting from the unusual or extraordinary conduct or the
precocious ingenuity displayed by this particular crowd of boys."
' 5a a
The court decided not to adapt the doctrine to an instance in which a
freight train standing on a track constitutes the alluring instrumen-
tality. 16
Another group of cases to which the courts have refused to extend
the attractive nuisance doctrine are those arising from injury or death
to children who played in and about ponds and other natural or
artificial bodies of water 7 Once established that the owner, as a rea-
sonable, prudent person, used the pond in a lawful, necessary and
useful way, he is not legally bound to guard it against trespassing
children. In view of the fact, that fencing the pond would render it
impracticable and disadvantageous to the owner, the court had not
imposed this type of restriction upon him, although it has conceded
that an unguarded pond is both attractive and dangerous to children.
In the words of the court, "all bodies of water deep enough to drown
a child and situated within roving distance of children present a danger
from which an injury to some person or death may reasonably be an-
ticipated. But it does not follow from such fact that there is a duty on
the part of the owner to fence or guard springs therefrom."' ' Kindred
cases illustrating the Wisconsin view are Klix v. Nieman0 9 and Emond
v. Kimberly Clark Co.70 In the former instance, a nine-year-old boy,
16175 Wis. 192, 184 N.W. 777 (1921).
rSa See case cited in note 65 at p. 198.
G6 "We do not consider that a train of railroad cars on a track can be classed
with turntables and like machinery as alluring and attractive to children, so
as to put the burden on railroad companies to carefully guard them against
danger to small children." Wendorf v. Director General of Railroads, 173
Wis. 53, 56, 180 N.W. 128 (1920).
67 Emond v. Kimberly-Clark Co., 159 Wis. 83, 149 N.W. 760 (1914); United
Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268, 42 Sup. Ct. 299, 66 L.ed. 615
(1921) ; Bicandi v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 55 Idaho 543, 44 P. (2d) 1103
(1935).
68 159 Wis. 83, 87, 149 N.W. 760 (1914).
9 68 Wis. 271, 32 N.W. 223 (1887).
70 159 Wis. 83, 149 N.W. 760 (1914).
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who played about an unfenced pond, fell into it and was drowned;
while in the latter case, a boy met the same fate, when he fell into the
pond adjacent to the spillway at which he played. In both of these
cases, the court aiming to protect the owner's unhindered lawful use
of the pond, deemed it just to release him from an alleged duty to the
child. This tendency, favoring the owner's interest, led to an express
distinction between an attractive nuisance and an "attractive lawful
object;" the pond in and of itself belong to the latter category 1
The principles evolved from the Klix and Emond cases were fol-
lowed in Fiel v. Racine72 where the court, in discussing the applica-
bility of the doctrine, further asserted that a body of water does not
in and of itself constitute a condition subjecting the owner to liability.
It was manifested in Fiel v. Racine that only when "there was some-
thing exceptional or extraordinary in the circumstances to render the
place peculiarly attractive, more so than the mere pond itself" would
the owner of the pond be charged with negligence under the doc-
trine.72a Peculiar circumstances demonstrating the exception referred
to in the Fiel case formed the basis of the decision in Brinilson v. Chi-
ago & N. W. R. R. Co.73 In this instance the defendant railroad com-
pany built a breakwater to protect its land from the actions of the
adjacent lake. The breakwater was covered by a planking which served
as a path to the street. A hole in the planking not easily discernible,
because steam was constantly rising up through it from a pit under-
neath, transformed the planking into a trap. On the day of the acci-
dent, a six-year-old boy on crossing the planking came upon the
invisible hole, fell into the pit containing steam and hot water, and was
fatally scalded. This condition created by the company itself "made
the pit a dangerous trap or pitfall to persons on the premises .17
3a
THE CONCLUSION
The foregoing attempt to analyze the development of the attradtive
nuisance doctrine from its origin to its present state shows the con-
flict of the courts in deciding the adaptability of the doctrine in cases
of injury to young children attracted to a dangerous structure or condi-
tion. Wisconsin's limited application of the theory of attractive nui-
sance, as appears from the analysis of the cases, does not make the
possessor of the instrumentality an insurer of the safety of children.
At most, the Wisconsin court gives due recognition to the child's
instinctive conduct, simultaneously protecting the possessor in his
lawful and necessary use of the instrumentality.
Emond v. Kimberly-Clark Co., 159 Wis. 83, 149 N.W. 760 (1914).
72 203 Wis. 149, 157, 233 N.W. 611 (1930).
72a See case cited in note 72.
73 144 Wis. 614, 129 N.W. 664 (1911).7a See case cited in case 73 at p. 619.
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